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GROUNDING	PROCEDURAL	RIGHTS	N.	P.	Adams		
I.	INTRODUCTION		If	Mary	culpably	commits	a	crime	and	then	is	punished	without	having	been	found	guilty	of	 that	 crime	 through	 the	process	of	 a	 trial,	 is	Mary	wronged?	Intuitively,	 yes.	 That	 is,	Mary	has	 a	 right	 not	 to	 be	punished	 absent	 a	 trial,	even	for	things	that	she	has	done	and	deserves	to	be	punished	for.1	The	most	commonsensical	and	direct	way	to	explain	this	wrong	is	to	appeal	to	Mary’s	pre-institutional	moral	right:	Mary	simply	has	such	a	right	in	virtue	of	what	morality	requires	in	the	treatment,	particularly	in	the	punishment,	of	others.	Such	a	 right	would	be	one	of	a	 class	of	 “general,	moral,	 judicial,	procedural	rights.”2	This	class	of	 rights	 is	often	 taken	 to	make	up	an	 important	part	of	rule	 of	 law	 and	 to	 explain	 why	 our	 punitive	 institutions	 must	 take	 a	particular	shape:	why	we	must	have	trials,	juries,	judges,	appeals,	competent	legal	 representation,	 a	 right	 to	 present	 evidence,	 and	 so	 on.	 Absent	 such	
																																																								1.	 Throughout	 the	 paper	 I	 assume	 a	 broadly	 Anglophone	 legal	 setting	 and	 appeal	 to	intuitions	 developed	 in	 such	 a	 setting.	 But	 the	 rights	 at	 stake	 should	 generalize	 to	 legal	settings	 where	 trials	 look	 very	 different.	 This	 discussion	 would	 benefit	 greatly	 from	 a	comparative	 perspective,	 which	 unfortunately	 I	 do	 not	 have	 the	 space	 to	 provide	 here.	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	highlighting	this	important	point.		2.	Christopher	Heath	Wellman,	Procedural	Rights,	20	LEGAL	THEORY	286,	287	(2014).		
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procedures,	our	punitive	institutions	are	unjustified	because	they	violate	our	(in	short)	procedural	rights.		 In	 a	 recent	 article,	 Christopher	 Heath	 Wellman	 argues	 for	 the	surprising	claim	that	 there	are	no	procedural	 rights.3	 	His	characteristically	clear	 and	 challenging	 argument	 goes	 against	 the	 orthodox	 and	 seemingly	uncontested	 consensus	 that	 such	 procedural	 rights	 exist	 and	 are	fundamental	 constraints	 on	 our	 legal	 systems.	 Wellman	 effectively	undermines	potential	grounds	for	procedural	rights	that	other	theorists	have	offered,	 so	 concludes	 that,	 in	 lieu	 of	 other	 possible	 grounds,	 we	 have	 no	procedural	rights.		Here	I	offer	two	novel	grounds	for	such	rights	and	so	conclude	that	we	do	have	some	procedural	rights.	As	with	other	theorists	who	have	addressed	this	problem,	including	Robert	Nozick,	R.	A.	Duff,	and	Larry	Alexander,	I	focus	on	the	ideas	that	procedures	protect	us	against	unreasonable	risks	and	that	using	 procedures	 can	 instantiate	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 respectful	 treatment.4	Although	 I	 reject	 his	 general	 skeptical	 conclusion,	 Wellman	 forces	 us	 to	
																																																								3.	Ibid.	4.	 ROBERT	 NOZICK,	 ANARCHY,	 STATE,	 AND	 UTOPIA	 (1974);	 R.A.	 DUFF,	 TRIALS	 AND	 PUNISHMENTS	(1991);	 Larry	 Alexander,	Are	 Procedural	 Rights	 Derivative	 Substantive	 Rights?	 17	 LAW	&	PHIL.	19	(1998).	For	a	different	perspective	grounding	some	procedural	constraints	in	the	rule	 of	 law,	 see	 Hock	 Lai	 Ho,	 The	 Criminal	 Trial,	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 and	 the	 Exclusion	 of	
Unlawfully	Obtained	Evidence,	10	CRIM.	LAW	&	PHIL.	106	(2016).	
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reconsider	both	which	procedural	rights	we	have	and	in	what	way	people	are	wronged	when	such	rights	are	violated.	In	 Section	 II	 I	 sketch	 Wellman’s	 position	 and	 extrapolate	 some	desiderata	 for	 an	 adequate	 theory	 of	 procedural	 rights.	 The	 details	 of	 his	arguments	are	considered	more	fully	throughout	the	article	as	I	address	his	concerns.	Section	III	focuses	on	the	idea	that	our	right	against	unreasonable	risks	grounds	a	right	to	an	institutionalized	system	of	punishment	that	must	include	certain	procedures.	Section	IV	applies	Philip	Pettit’s	notion	of	robust	goods	 to	 punishment	 and	 argues	 that	 we	 have	 a	 right	 to	 security	 that	obligates	 others	 to	 follow	 certain	 procedures	 in	 some	 circumstances.5	 I	conclude	that	there	are	two	distinct	grounds—risk	protection	and	security—from	which	we	can	derive	procedural	rights	of	two	related	but	interestingly	distinct	kinds.			
II.	THE	SKEPTICAL	CHALLENGE		Wellman’s	view	is	nuanced	and	can	easily	be	mistaken	for	more	implausible	nearby	views.	To	be	clear	about	his	position,	it	is	first	important	to	make	two	distinctions:	 first,	between	moral	and	legal	rights	and	second,	between	pre-institutional	and	post-institutional	moral	rights.	Wellman	does	not	deny,	for	example,	that	United	States	citizens	have	a	positive	legal	right	against	double	jeopardy	 and	 he	 does	 not	 deny	 that	 such	 a	 legal	 right	may	 very	well	 have																																																									5.	PHILIP	PETTIT,	THE	ROBUST	DEMANDS	OF	THE	GOOD	(2015).	
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moral	grounds,	such	as	concerns	of	reliability.	Nor	does	he	deny	that	once	an	institution	exists	and	has	committed	itself	not	to	prosecute	citizens	twice	for	the	same	crime,	this	commitment	can	generate	a	moral	right	against	double	jeopardy.	What	Wellman	 denies	 is	 the	 existence	 of	 pre-institutional	 moral	procedural	rights.		Wellman	 begins	 by	 arguing	 that	 we	 do	 not	 have	 a	 pre-institutional	moral	 right	 against	 double	 jeopardy.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 a	 right	 against	 double	jeopardy	 provides	 us	 with	 some	 protections,	 particularly	 by	 preventing	 a	sort	of	harassment	that	could	unreasonably	interfere	with	citizens’	lives	and	that	might	lead	to	more	innocents	being	convicted	or	pleading	guilty	simply	to	 avoid	 the	 costs	 of	 repeated	 prosecution.	 But	 if	 we	 can	 imagine	 an	institutional	 arrangement	 that	 does	 a	 better	 job	 securing	 these	 benefits	without	 a	 restriction	 on	 double	 jeopardy,	 is	 anything	 lost	 if	 we	 choose	 to	change	our	institution	and	set	aside	the	restriction?	There	does	not	seem	to	be	anything	about	repeatedly	trying	a	case	that	is	intrinsically	objectionable;	after	all,	double	jeopardy	is	only	triggered	under	certain	conditions	and	with	respect	to	certain	jurisdictions.	Wellman	gives	the	instructive	example	of	an	institution	 that	 did	 not	 protect	 against	 double	 jeopardy	 but	 significantly	raised	the	evidentiary	standard	that	must	be	met	for	conviction.	It	could	be	the	 case	 that	 such	 an	 institution	 would	 convict	 more	 guilty	 people	 and	convict	 fewer	 innocent	 people	 than	 an	 institution	with	 protections	 against	double	jeopardy	but	a	lower	evidentiary	standard.		
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If	we	lack	a	pre-institutional	moral	right	against	double	jeopardy,	then	the	choice	between	these	institutional	arrangements	is	live	and	interesting:	it	would	make	sense	to	investigate	the	choice	empirically	in	order	to	determine	which	 arrangement	 is	 better.	 If	 we	 have	 a	 pre-institutional	 moral	 right	against	double	jeopardy,	though,	then	only	the	institutional	arrangement	that	protects	against	double	jeopardy	could	possibly	be	justified.	Of	course	even	if	we	 lack	 a	 right	 against	 double	 jeopardy,	 it	 may	 still	 be	 the	 case	 that	 we	should	 opt	 for	 a	 system	 with	 double	 jeopardy	 protections	 because	 the	alternatives	 simply	 enable	 too	much	 harassment.	 But	 at	 this	 point	 we	 are	weighing	the	costs	and	benefits	of	various	institutional	alternatives,	which	is	precisely	the	sort	of	weighing	that	is	irrelevant	if	we	have	a	pre-institutional	moral	 right	against	double	 jeopardy	 that	 serves	as	a	 side	constraint	on	our	institutions.	It	is	hard	to	see	why	this	choice	would	not	be	open	to	us	based	on	a	very	specific	pre-institutional	moral	right	against	double	jeopardy.	Wellman’s	 argument	 against	 a	 pre-institutional	moral	 right	 to	 a	 fair	trial,	or	more	generally	each	individual’s	“right	against	being	punished	until	she	has	been	proven	guilty	by	a	 fair,	reliable,	and	public	process,”	proceeds	differently.6	Wellman	 imagines	a	 case	where	a	 robbery	 is	 committed	 in	 the	utopian	 Justland	 but	 the	 perpetrator	 cannot	 be	 discovered.	 In	 order	 to	mitigate	the	effects	of	this	uniquely	unpunished	crime,	the	society	decides	by	plebiscite	 to	 punish	 someone	 chosen	 by	 lottery.	 Sandra	 is	 chosen	 by	 the	lottery	 and	 is	 subsequently	 punished	 but,	 in	 the	 challenging	 twist,	 Sandra																																																									6.	Wellman,	supra	note	1,	at	290.	
6		
actually	committed	the	crime.	Wellman	contends	that	none	of	Sandra’s	rights	have	been	violated—Sandra	is	not	wronged	by	this	punishment—because	by	committing	the	crime	she	forfeited	her	right	against	being	punished.7	There	is	 no	 question	 of	 Sandra’s	 legal	 or	 post-institutional	 rights	 being	 violated	because	 ex	 hypothesi	 the	 Justlanders’	 institutions	 authorized	 the	 lottery.	 If	none	 of	 Sandra’s	 rights	 have	 been	 violated	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 she	 was	punished	 by	 such	 an	 arbitrary	 procedure,	 then	 she	 must	 not	 have	 a	 pre-institutional	moral	right	against	being	punished	absent	a	trial.		To	be	clear,	the	Justlanders	may	be	blameworthy	for	using	the	lottery	to	 punish	 Sandra.	 But	wrongness	 is	 a	 question	 of	 fact-relative	 or	 objective	permissibility	whereas	blameworthiness	is	a	question	of	evidence-relative	or	subjective	permissibility.8	Whether	Sandra	was	wronged	is	a	question	about	the	rights	she	actually	has	while	whether	the	Justlanders	were	blameworthy	is	a	question	about	their	mental	state	when	they	acted.	So	Wellman	is	willing	
																																																								7.	On	Wellman’s	rights	forfeiture	view	of	punishment,	see	Christopher	Heath	Wellman,	The	
Rights	 Forfeiture	 Theory	 of	 Punishment,	 122	 ETHICS	 371	 (2012).	 Much	 of	 the	 discussion	below	 presumes	 at	 least	 a	 weak	 rights	 forfeiture	 view,	 which	 I	 endorse,	 but	 does	 not	presume	the	strong	rights	forfeiture	view,	which	I	do	not.	8.	 On	 the	 distinction	 between	 fact-relative,	 evidence-relative,	 and	 belief-relative	permissibility,	see	DEREK	PARFIT,	ON	WHAT	MATTERS	150	(vol.	1,	2012).	On	wrongness	as	a	fact-relative	matter,	see	Peter	A.	Graham,	In	Defense	of	Objectivism	about	Moral	Obligation,	121	 ETHICS	 88	 (2010).	 Of	 course,	 not	 everyone	 conceives	 of	 wrongness	 and	blameworthiness	 in	 this	way	but	Wellman	 and	 I	 both	do;	 see	Wellman,	 supra	 note	 1,	 at	297.	
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to	 admit	 that	 we	 should	 blame	 the	 Justlanders	 for	 employing	 an	 arbitrary	procedure	that,	as	luck	would	have	it	and	unbeknownst	to	them,	happened	to	punish	 the	 culpable	 offender.	The	distinct	 question	 for	procedural	 rights	 is	whether	Sandra	was	wronged	by	the	Justlanders’	actions.	Wellman’s	 case	 for	 his	 broad	 skeptical	 conclusion	 that	 there	 are	 no	procedural	 rights	 rests	 primarily	 on	 his	 discussion	 of	 these	 two	 cases.	 In	support	 he	 also	 considers	 and	 rejects	 a	 variety	 of	 grounds	 that	 other	theorists	 have	 proposed	 for	 procedural	 rights	 and	 he	 considers	 what	implications	his	 skepticism	might	have	 for	 the	human	right	 to	due	process.	Finding	 no	 firm	 basis	 for	 these	 two	 particular	 procedural	 rights	 in	 the	literature,	Wellman	 generalizes	 his	 conclusion	 and	 claims	 that	we	 have	 no	such	rights	at	all.	In	order	to	address	this	skepticism	below,	it	helps	to	clarify	the	point	of	a	theory	of	procedural	rights,	which	will	inform	what	sorts	of	rights	will	be	plausible	components	of	such	a	theory.	As	noted,	certain	kinds	of	rights	will	not	 do:	 positive	 legal	 procedural	 rights	 and	 post-institutional	 moral	 rights	that	 arise	 out	 of	 a	 commitment	 by	 the	 institution	 to	 follow	 certain	procedures.	 But	 why	 are	 these	 sorts	 of	 rights	 insufficient?	 What	 do	 pre-institutional	moral	procedural	rights	do	that	these	rights	cannot?	Notice,	 first,	 what	 legal	 and	 post-institutional	 moral	 rights	 can	 do:	they	can	explain	our	 judgment	 that	 subjects	of	a	 liberal	 constitutional	 legal	regime	 are	wronged	 if	 they	 are	 punished	 absent	 a	 trial,	 or	more	 generally	without	 first	 going	 through	a	 fair	 set	 of	procedures.	 Since	 such	 institutions	
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commit	themselves	to	using	trials	and	other	familiar	procedures,	subjects	of	such	 institutions	 have	 legal	 and	 post-institutional	 moral	 rights	 that	 are	violated	if	they	are	punished	without	the	appropriate	procedures	being	used.		This	 is	 important	 for	 the	 skeptic	 because	 it	 provides	 the	 basis	 for	 a	plausible	 error	 theory	 about	 pre-institutional	 moral	 procedural	 rights.	 I	personally	have	 the	 intuition	 that	people	are	wronged	 if	 they	are	punished	without	 first	 going	 through	 fair	 procedures	 even	 outside	 the	 context	 of	 a	liberal	 constitutional	 legal	 regime.	 However,	 this	 may	 be	 because	 my	intuitions	were	 formed	 in	 a	 context	where	 people	are	 so	wronged	 but	 the	explanation	of	the	wrongness	that	fuels	my	intuitions	is	grounded	in	the	legal	and	 post-institutional	 moral	 rights	 that	 I	 am	 familiar	 with,	 not	 pre-institutional	moral	rights.	If	we	can	explain	away	our	considered	judgments	about	 such	 cases,	 then	 denying	 the	 existence	 of	 pre-institutional	 moral	procedural	rights	is	not	as	implausible	as	it	may	seem	at	first	glance.	That	 said,	 we	 often	 employ	 our	 judgments	 about	 punishment	 and	procedural	 rights	 outside	 a	 liberal	 constitutional	 context	 and	 this	 is	where	the	skepticism	matters.	First,	when	considering	areas	of	the	world	that	 lack	rule	of	law,	we	are	tempted	to	say	that	people	who	are	punished	without	the	relevant	procedures—without	trials,	without	juries,	without	presentation	of	evidence,	 without	 an	 independent	 judiciary,	 and	 so	 on—are	 wronged.	 In	these	 cases	 they	 cannot	 be	wronged	 in	 virtue	 of	 legal	 or	 post-institutional	moral	 rights	 precisely	 because	 there	 are	 no	 such	 rights	 in	 the	 absence	 of	institutions	 making	 specific	 commitments.	 If	 (even	 culpable)	 people	 are	
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genuinely	wronged	when	punished	in	such	circumstances,	it	must	be	because	they	have	pre-institutional	moral	rights	that	are	being	violated.	Second,	 and	 relatedly	 but	 not	 identically,	 pre-institutional	 moral	rights	constrain	our	choices	between	institutional	alternatives,	as	illustrated	with	 the	 example	 of	 double	 jeopardy.9	 If	 there	 is	 a	 pre-institutional	moral	procedural	 right	 to	 double	 jeopardy,	 then	 any	 institution	 that	 does	 not	protect	subjects	against	double	jeopardy	is	necessarily	wronging	its	subjects,	i.e.	 violating	 their	 rights.	But	 if	 such	a	procedural	 right	does	not	exist,	 then	the	 reasons	 that	 count	 in	 favor	 of	 a	 right	 against	 double	 jeopardy	 can	 be	balanced	against	other	considerations.		Legal	or	post-institutional	moral	 rights	 cannot	 constrain	our	 choices	among	 institutional	 alternatives	 precisely	 because	 such	 rights	 are	 absent	without	 the	 institutions	 that	 we	 are	 choosing	 among.10	 Skepticism	 about	procedural	rights	importantly	entails	that	whatever	reasons	institutions	have	to	 establish	 specific	 procedures,	 securing	 citizens’	 pre-institutional	 moral																																																									9.	Wellman,	supra	note	1,	at	288-89.	10.	To	be	clear,	this	does	not	mean	that	what	legal	or	post-institutional	moral	rights	people	might	 have	 under	 a	 particular	 regime	 cannot	 serve	 as	 a	 point	 of	 comparison	 between	institutional	alternatives.	The	point	 is	that	we	cannot	take	the	existence	of	such	rights	to	constrain	our	choices	between	alternatives:	the	fact	that	you	would	have	a	right	to	P	under	regime	A	tells	us	nothing	about	whether	choosing	regime	B,	where	you	are	not	provided	P,	violates	your	rights	and	so	tells	us	nothing	about	whether	choosing	regime	B	is	unjustified.	That	having	a	right	to	P	under	A	is	a	good-making	feature	of	A	is	independent	of	whether	opting	for	B	violates	your	rights.	
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procedural	 rights	 is	 not	 among	 them.	 This	 is	 in	 distinct	 contrast	 to	 many	other	 cases:	 paramount	 among	 the	 reasons	 for	 there	 to	 be	 a	 law	 against	murder	is	people’s	pre-institutional	moral	right	to	life.	Any	legal	regime	that	does	not	include	a	law	against	murder	is	unjustified	because	it	fails	to	protect	that	right.	Denying	the	existence	of	pre-institutional	moral	procedural	rights	thus	 changes	 the	 sort	 of	 justification	 that	 must	 be	 given	 for	 our	 choices	among	 institutional	 alternatives.	 In	 sum,	 procedural	 rights	 of	 the	 relevant	sort	 play	 two	 important	 roles:	 constraining	 choices	 among	 institutional	alternatives	 and	 explaining	 the	 particular	 wrong	 of	 punishing	 someone	absent	sufficient	procedures.	Before	 proceeding,	 two	 notes:	 first,	 nothing	 I	 say	 here	 contradicts	Wellman’s	 conclusion	 that	 there	 is	 no	 pre-institutional	moral	 right	 against	double	 jeopardy.	 In	 fact,	 Wellman	 convinced	 me	 that	 there	 is	 not.	 I	 take	objection	to	his	argument	against	the	(to	my	mind	much	more	fundamental)	right	to	a	fair	trial	and	to	his	more	general	skeptical	conclusion.	An	important	lesson	of	his	article,	however,	is	that	at	least	some	of	what	we	conceive	of	as	pre-institutional	 moral	 procedural	 rights	 should	 instead	 be	 understood	purely	instrumentally.	Wellman’s	argument	importantly	clears	the	way	for	a	greater	 variety	 of	 institutional	 alternatives	 and	 so	 hopefully	 helps	 us	 think	better	about	how	to	understand	and	improve	our	legal	institutions.	Second,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 Sandra	 has	 a	 pre-institutional	moral	right	that	the	punitive	lottery	seems	to	violate:	the	right	to	be	treated	in	the	same	 way	 as	 others	 under	 the	 same	 legal	 regime.	 In	 Justland,	 all	 other	
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punishments	have	resulted	from	trials,	but	in	this	one	case	Sandra	is	subject	to	 a	 lottery	 and	 this	 seems	 to	wrong	 her	 because	 it	 is	 unfair.	 The	 sense	 of	fairness	being	appealed	to	here	is	of	a	different,	more	relational	sort	than	the	fairness	appealed	 to	 in	 the	 right	 to	a	 fair	 trial.	While	 it	 is	plausible	 that	we	have	 a	 right	 to	 relationally	 fair	 treatment,	 however,	 the	 complaint	 of	relational	 unfairness	 cannot	 ground	 procedural	 rights	 of	 the	 relevant	 sort.	The	 primary	 problem	 is	 that	 seriously	 unjust	 legal	 regimes	 can	 treat	everyone	 fairly	 in	 the	relational	sense	by	treating	them	all	equally	unjustly.	Even	 worse,	 someone	 who	 metes	 out	 punishment	 to	 people	 without	following	 any	 procedures	 at	 all	 can	 avoid	 the	 complaint	 of	 relational	unfairness	 as	 long	 as	 they	 avoid	 procedures	 equally	 across	 cases.	 So	relational	unfairness	of	this	kind	cannot	ground	procedural	rights	that	do	the	work	we	want	them	to	do,	even	though	a	pre-institutional	moral	right	against	relationally	unfair	treatment	can	explain	some	nearby	wrongs	(and	so	could	also	contribute	to	the	skeptic’s	error	theory).		
III.	SYSTEMIC	PROCEDURAL	RIGHTS		Most	 discussions	 of	 procedural	 rights	 correctly	 focus	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 risk.	People	 not	 only	 have	 pre-institutional	 moral	 rights	 against	 being	 harmed,	they	have	rights	against	unreasonable	risks	of	harms.11	Such	rights	explain,																																																									11.	 Claire	 Finkelstein,	 Is	 Risk	 a	 Harm?	 151	 U.	 PENN.	 LAW	 REV.	 963	 (2003);	 John	 Oberdiek,	
Towards	a	Right	Against	Risking,	28	LAW	&	PHIL.	367	(2009).		
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for	example,	why	I	wrong	you	if	I	take	five	bullets	out	of	my	revolver	and	fire	it	at	you	for	my	amusement	but	happen	to	hit	an	empty	cylinder.	Even	though	I	 did	 not	 physically	 harm	 you,	 as	 I	 would	 have	 had	 I	 fired	 the	 single	remaining	bullet,	I	still	wronged	you	because	I	unreasonably	risked	your	life.	As	this	example	makes	obvious,	what	amounts	to	reasonable	risk	depends	on	a	variety	of	factors:	the	gravity	of	harm,	the	likelihood	of	harm,	the	purpose	of	the	risk,	and	so	on.12	Imposing	a	small	risk	of	death	may	be	unreasonable	while	imposing	a	large	risk	of	a	light	scratch	may	be	reasonable;	imposing	a	tiny	risk	of	a	burn	to	save	many	lives	is	reasonable	while	imposing	a	tiny	risk	of	 a	 burn	 for	 my	 amusement	 may	 not	 be.	 Since	 punishment	 involves	 the	intentional	 infliction	 of	 harm,	 our	 general	 right	 against	 unreasonable	 risk	also	protects	us	against	unreasonable	risks	of	punishment.13		 A	 pre-institutional	 moral	 right	 against	 an	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	punishment	can	ground	procedural	rights	of	a	certain	sort.	Wellman	admits	this	 when	 he	 considers	 a	 modified	 Justland	 case	 where,	 instead	 of	 simply																																																									12.	 A	 terminological	 note:	 I	 use	 ‘harm’	 in	 a	 non-moralized	 sense	 to	 mean	 the	 setback	 of	interests.	 Some	 philosophers	 prefer	 to	 use	 ‘harm’	 such	 that	 only	wrongful	 setbacks	 are	harmful.	This	seems	to	me	quite	mistaken,	although	I	admit	that	there	may	be	a	constraint	such	 that	 very	 minor	 setbacks	 are	 not	 properly	 thought	 of	 as	 harm.	 Thanks	 to	 an	anonymous	referee	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	this.	13.	The	relevant	risk	is	risk	of	wrongful	punishment:	if	I	have	culpably	committed	an	offense	and	so	forfeited	my	right	against	punishment,	that	punishment	is	not	wrongful	and	so	any	risk	 of	 that	 punishment	 is	 not	 unreasonable,	 as	 Wellman	 emphasizes	 in	 the	 Sandra	example.	
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using	a	lottery	in	one	aberrant	instance,	the	punitive	lottery	is	routinely	used	to	 mete	 out	 punishment.14	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 a	 lottery	 system	 exposes	 all	Justlanders	 to	 unreasonable	 risks	 of	 punishment	 precisely	 because	 the	lottery	is	arbitrary	and	does	not	track	who	is	liable	to	punishment.	Because	lotteries	 are	 arbitrary,	 we	 have	 a	 pre-institutional	 moral	 right	 against	 a	system	 that	 uses	 routine	 punitive	 lotteries.	 Like	 the	 ostensible	 procedural	right	against	double	 jeopardy,	 this	 is	a	negative	procedural	 right:	 it	 tells	us	what	 kinds	 of	 procedures	 are	 insufficiently	 protective	 of	 our	 rights	 against	unreasonable	risks.		 Similarly,	 we	 have	 a	 pre-institutional	 moral	 right	 to	 an	institutionalized	system	of	punishment	in	general.	This	is	part	of	the	familiar	Lockean	 justification	 for	 the	 state,	 which	 Wellman	 has	 endorsed.15	 In	 the	state	 of	 nature,	 private	 individuals	will	 take	 it	 upon	 themselves	 to	 punish.	However,	due	to	personal	bias,	disagreements,	and	other	factors,	this	would	lead	 to	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 wrongful	 punishment.	 Being	 in	 the	 state	 of	 nature,	where	ex	hypothesi	there	are	no	political	institutions,	puts	us	at	unreasonable	risk	of	punishment	and	so	violates	our	 rights.	This	very	general	 right	 to	an	institutionalized	 system	 of	 punishment	 is	 not	 yet	 a	 procedural	 right	 of	 the	relevant	 sort	 but	 thinking	 about	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 punishment	 in	 this	manner	can	also	ground	rights	to	more	specific	procedures.																																																									14.	Wellman,	supra	note	1,	at	292.	15.	Christopher	Heath	Wellman,	Samaritanism	and	the	Duty	to	Obey	the	Law,	in	CHRISTOPHER	HEATH	WELLMAN	&	A.	JOHN	SIMMONS,	IS	THERE	A	DUTY	TO	OBEY	THE	LAW?	2,	6-10	(2005).		
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Consider	the	procedure	of	the	trial	 in	its	most	general	sense.	Can	we	imagine	any	system	that	does	not	include	trials	but	is	sufficiently	reliable	at	meting	 out	 deserved	 punishment?	 What	 plausible	 alternatives	 are	 there?	Summary	 punishment	 of	 suspects	 by	 law	 enforcement?	 Following	 mob	mentality?	The	general	notion	of	a	trial	encompasses	many	variations;	even	a	king	hearing	both	sides	of	a	case	and	simply	deciding	on	his	own	monarchical	judgment	 is	 a	 trial	 (if	 an	 inadequate	one).	 Institutions	without	 trials	of	 any	sort	seem	paradigmatically	unreliable	precisely	because	they	by	definition	do	not	include	testing	of	the	claim	of	guilt	via	consideration	of	the	details	of	the	case.	These	examples	are	somewhat	ludicrous	and	I	do	not	want	to	be	unfair	to	 the	skeptic.	But	 it	 is	difficult	 for	me	 to	 imagine	a	 judicial	 institution	 that	does	not	include	trials	and	is	sufficiently	reliable	such	that	it	does	not	violate	its	subjects’	right	against	unreasonable	risk	of	punishment.	If	this	is	correct,	then	we	have	a	pre-institutional	moral	 right	 to	a	punitive	 system	 that	uses	trials	to	determine	guilt.	This	 argument	 schema	 can	 show	 that	 we	 have	 further	 particular	procedural	rights.	For	example,	a	trial	system	that	did	not	include	an	appeal	process	of	some	sort	seems	unreasonably	risky	given	that	any	particular	trial	can	fail	in	a	huge	variety	of	unseen	ways.	Similarly,	the	right	to	a	speedy	trial	follows	from	the	fact	that	 lengthy	and	indefinite	detention	without	a	trial	 is	unreasonably	 risky	 given	 that	 it	 significantly	 harms	 people	 irrespective	 of	
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determination	of	their	guilt.16	The	point	is	that	focusing	on	unreasonable	risk	in	 the	 system	 shows	 that	 there	 are	 at	 least	 some	 familiar	 procedures	 the	absence	 of	 which	 would	 make	 the	 system	 unreasonably	 risky.	 Some	procedural	rights	that	we	take	for	granted	cannot	be	grounded	in	this	way,	as	Wellman’s	 discussion	 of	 double	 jeopardy	 demonstrates.	 I	 cannot	 here	undertake	the	large	task	of	considering	our	legal	systems’	many	procedures	and	ask	whether	their	absence	or	presence	is	absolutely	necessary	to	avoid	an	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 punishment.	 The	 point	 is	 that	 we	 have	 some	procedural	rights.	Procedural	rights	of	this	systemic	sort—rights	to	an	institutionalized	system	of	punishment	that	includes	certain	procedures—can	clearly	play	one	role	we	 identified	 for	a	 theory	of	procedural	 rights	 in	 the	previous	 section.	Systemic	 rights	 set	 constraints	 on	 our	 choices	 between	 institutional	alternatives.	When	considering	whether	we	are	 justified	 in	establishing	and	operating	a	punitive	system	without	trials	or	with	trials,	we	have	to	choose	the	system	with	trials.	Although	the	system	without	trials	may	be	much	less	costly	 in	 terms	 of	 time	 and	 resources,	 such	 a	 system	 would	 impose	 an	unreasonable	risk	of	undeserved	punishment	on	all	its	subjects	and	so	would																																																									16.	 As	 an	 anonymous	 referee	 emphasized,	 this	 is	 not	 quite	 the	 same	 as	 “meting	 out	 hard	treatment,”	which	 is	 how	 I	 originally	 framed	 the	 problem.	Note,	 however,	 that	 I	 am	not	claiming	that	pre-trial	detention	in	general	is	problematic	but	that	“lengthy	and	indefinite”	detention	 is.	 The	 details	 will	 depend	 on	 how	 the	 various	 values	 that	 undergird	 the	justification	 of	 pre-trial	 detention	 are	 balanced	 against	 the	 harms	 imposed	 by	 such	detention.	
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violate	 their	 pre-institutional	moral	 rights.	We	 cannot	 undertake	 the	 same	weighing	of	 costs	and	benefits	as	we	could	when	we	were	considering	 two	systems	that	do	not	violate	pre-institutional	moral	rights,	 like	one	including	double	jeopardy	and	one	not.	We	have	to	opt	for	the	institutional	alternative	that	incorporates	trials.		 That	 said,	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 problem	 with	 systemic	 procedural	rights:	 they	 utterly	 fail	 to	 play	 the	 other	 role	 that	 we	 identified,	 namely	explaining	 how	 actually	 punishing	 someone	 using	 an	 unfair	 procedure	wrongs	them.	Systemic	rights	are	not	triggered	by	a	particular	unfair	trial	or	unjust	procedure.	Instead,	they	are	in	some	sense	environmental:	without	a	system	with	the	appropriate	procedures,	we	are	all	subject	to	a	constant	risk	of	 unjustified	 punishment.	 This	means	 systemic	 rights	 are	 silent	 in	 both	 of	the	 cases	 where	 the	 role	 of	 identifying	 particular	 wrongs	 by	 unfair	procedures	is	most	pressing.		First,	in	the	state	of	nature,	we	would	all	be	wronged	all	the	time	by	the	lack	of	political	institutions	for	meting	out	punishment.	But,	as	Wellman	notes,	systemic	rights	are	only	plausibly	held	against	collectives	because	no	individual	 can	 establish	 and	 maintain	 an	 institutionalized	 system	 of	punishment	 on	 her	 own.17	 An	 individual	 in	 the	 state	 of	 nature	may	 have	 a	duty	to	do	her	 fair	share	towards	establishing	such	a	system,	but	 if	she	has	done	her	fair	share	systemic	rights	cannot	make	any	more	demands	on	her.	Thus	if	we	imagine	a	case	where	she	has	done	her	fair	share	but	there	is	still																																																									17.	Personal	correspondence.	
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no	 punitive	 system	 because	 not	 enough	 others	 have	 contributed,	 systemic	rights	are	silent.	If	she	proceeds	to	punish	someone	on	her	own	under	such	conditions,	then,	systemic	rights	do	not	provide	any	basis	for	saying	that	she	acts	wrongfully,	regardless	of	whether	she	uses	fair	procedures	or	not.	Similarly,	 in	 the	 case	 where	 Justland	 uses	 routine	 punitive	 lotteries	rather	than	trials,	all	Justlanders	are	being	wronged	by	the	unreasonable	risk	of	 undeserved	 punishment	 that	 they	 constantly	 face	 due	 to	 the	 features	 of	their	system.	But	in	the	original	Sandra	case,	Justland	is	stipulated	to	have	a	generally	just	system	of	punishment.	In	normal	cases,	Justland	uses	trials	and	courts	and	appeals	and	everything	else	that	we	want.	What	makes	Sandra’s	case	difficult	is	precisely	that	the	punitive	lottery	is	an	aberration	rather	than	a	regular	feature	of	the	system	and	so	Sandra	seemingly	has	no	complaint	of	being	 exposed	 to	 an	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 punishment	 from	 the	 system.	 In	both	 cases	 systemic	 procedural	 rights	 fail	 to	 explain	 the	 wrong	 that	procedural	rights	are	often	precisely	used	to	explain,	namely	how	individuals	are	specifically	wronged	by	punishment	that	results	from	unfair	procedures.	The	wrong	of	an	unreasonable	risk	of	punishment	 from	unreliable	punitive	systems	 and	 the	 wrong	 of	 punishment	 that	 results	 from	 particular	 unfair	procedures	are	simply	distinct.			 This	 is	a	significant	problem	for	grounding	procedural	 rights	only	 in	systemic	 concerns.	 In	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 section	 I	 push	 the	 case	 for	 systemic	procedural	rights	as	far	as	I	plausibly	can.	In	part	this	is	because	I	think	the	Justland	case	obscures	an	 important	 feature	of	systemic	rights	and	pushing	
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the	case	for	such	rights	illuminates	the	nature	of	systemic	procedural	rights	more	broadly.	Ultimately,	however,	I	am	not	confident	that	this	problem	can	be	satisfactorily	answered	by	appealing	only	to	systemic	procedural	rights.	If	not,	 and	 if	 systemic	 rights	 are	 the	 only	 solid	 ground	 for	 procedural	 rights,	then	 we	 may	 simply	 have	 to	 accept	 that	 procedural	 rights	 cannot	 do	everything	we	have	traditionally	taken	them	to	do.	But	this	is	also	why	I	offer	another	 ground	 for	 procedural	 rights	 in	 the	 next	 section.	 I	 think	 these	distinct	arguments	are	both	correct	and	that	they	ground	related	but	distinct	kinds	of	procedural	rights.			 Systemic	 rights	 can	 explain	 why	 Sandra	 is	 wronged	 in	 Justland	because	 the	 risk	 that	 Sandra	 is	 exposed	 to	 is	 not	 simply	 the	 risk	 of	 the	arbitrary	punitive	lottery.	The	Justlanders’	system	imposes	an	unreasonable	risk	 on	 its	 subjects	 simply	 because	 it	 can	 allow	 a	 punitive	 lottery	 to	 be	enacted.	 In	our	own	actual	 legal	 systems,	 such	a	plebiscite	would	be	struck	down	by	 the	courts	even	 if	 it	 successfully	passed.	Sandra	 is	wronged	 in	 the	one-off	 lottery	case	precisely	because	the	 Justlanders’	system	lacks	 the	sort	of	 contra-majoritarian	 checks	 that	 a	 fair	 and	 reliable	 judicial	 system	must	contain.	Fair	and	reliable	 systems	have	 judicial	 review	precisely	 to	 restrain	the	majority	from	making	this	sort	of	“wacky”	decision.18	A	system	that	does	not	 have	 serious	 restraints	 on	 the	 sorts	 of	 clearly	 arbitrary	 treatment	 of	individuals	 that	 this	 lottery	 represents	 is	 ipso	 facto	 violating	 its	 citizens’	rights.	All	the	Justlanders	are	subject	to	an	unfair	and	unreliable	system.	The																																																									18.	Wellman,	supra	note	1,	at	290.	
19		
fact	that	they	only	used	the	lottery	once	is	irrelevant;	the	problem	is	that	they	could	ever	use	a	punitive	lottery	at	all.		A	resolute	skeptic	about	procedural	rights	might	object	that	the	mere	capacity	of	the	Justlanders	to	use	a	one-off	punitive	lottery	does	not	subject	Sandra	 to	 unreasonable	 risks,	 for	 two	 reasons.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 the	Justlanders	 only	 use	 the	 lottery	 after	 a	 rigorous	 process:	 “After	 extensive	public	 discussion	 and	 deliberation,	 all	 ten	million	 Justlanders	 voted	 in	 the	plebiscite,	and	the	motion	was	affirmed	by	a	two-thirds	majority.”19	Not	only	was	there	a	vote,	 it	was	a	direct	vote	rather	than	by	representatives,	 it	was	taken	 only	 after	 extensive	 public	 deliberation,	 there	 was	 unanimous	participation,	 and	 the	 plebiscite	 passed	 with	 two-thirds	 of	 the	 vote	 rather	than	a	mere	majority.	While	the	Justlanders’	system	contains	some	risk,	it	is	not	an	unreasonable	risk	because	the	stringent	conditions	on	this	lottery	are	very	unlikely	to	be	met	again.	The	mere	fact	that	the	risky	outcome	occurred	does	not	show	that	the	risk	was	unreasonable.		This	goes	well	with	the	other	point	 the	resolute	skeptic	might	make,	namely	 that	 no	 system	 can	 perfectly	 protect	 against	 such	 a	 risk.	 Given	 the	two-thirds	 majority,	 for	 example,	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	 could	 have	 been	amended	 to	 make	 such	 a	 lottery	 legally	 permissible,	 rendering	 judicial	review	 irrelevant.	 Yet	 we	 do	 not	 think	 that	 the	 mere	 possibility	 that	 the	Constitution	could	be	amended	 in	such	a	way	means	that	we	are	subject	 to	unreasonable	 risk	 of	 punitive	 lotteries.	 We	 need	 some	 notion	 of																																																									19.	Ibid.	
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unreasonable	 risk	 that	 does	 not	 entail	 that	 any	 fallible	 system,	 i.e.	 every	actual	system,	is	unreasonably	risky.	While	 it	 is	 true	 that	 there	 are	 no	 perfect	 systems,	 this	 ignores	 two	salient	 points.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 some	 legal	 systems,	 like	 Germany’s,	 have	rights	 that	 explicitly	 cannot	 be	 amended	 by	 the	 population	 regardless	 of	 a	vote;	perhaps	 there	 is	good	reason	 to	 think	 that	 lacking	such	unchangeable	elements	 is	 unreasonably	 risky	 in	 light	 of	 the	 vagaries	 of	 majority	 rule.	Indeed,	 this	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 most	 obvious	 justification	 for	 the	 German	system,	which	was	 implemented	after	World	War	 II.	Of	 course,	 even	 this	 is	not	perfect	as	the	constitutional	order	as	a	whole	could	collapse.		This	 leads	 to	 the	 second	point.	 The	 fairness	 and	 reliability	 of	 a	 trial	must	 be	 assessed	 relative	 to	 the	 overall	 system	 in	 which	 the	 trial	 occurs.	Consider	 all	 the	 elements	 of	 a	 trial	 that	 contribute	 to	 its	 fairness	 and	reliability.	First,	 there	are	all	 the	norms	 that	are	 independent	of	 the	 formal	constraints.	These	norms	are	a	community	matter,	developed	over	time	and	tested	in	innumerable	cases.	No	matter	the	formal	features	of	a	single	trial,	it	would	need	to	be	bolstered	by	reliable	norms	because	how	rules	operate	in	practice	 is	a	 function	of	norms.	 It	was	not	only	 the	 Justlanders’	 institutions	that	failed,	it	was	also	their	sense	of	justice.	Second,	 the	 fairness	 and	 reliability	 of	 all	 the	 formal	 features	 that	contribute	to	the	fairness	and	reliability	of	a	trial—the	judge,	presentation	of	evidence,	 adequate	 legal	 representation,	 and	 so	 on—are	 themselves	dependent	 on	 the	 entire	 system.	 The	 sort	 of	 judge	 that	 profoundly	
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contributes	 to	 the	 fairness	 and	 reliability	 of	 a	 trial	 is	 bound	 by	jurisprudential	norms	and	precedent,	is	trained	in	jurisprudence,	is	beholden	to	reputational	and	other	social	constraints,	makes	their	decisions	publicly	so	that	they	can	be	subject	to	review,	and	so	on.	A	truly	systemic	understanding	of	 fairness	 and	 reliability	 concerns	 more	 than	 the	 explicit	 legal	 system,	extending	 to	 include	 institutions	 that	 train	 and	 regulate	 judges.	 Fair	 and	reliable	trials	require	the	presentation	of	evidence,	but	evidence	is	not	simply	recitation	of	facts.	The	sort	of	presentation	of	evidence	that	contributes	to	the	fairness	and	reliability	of	a	trial	is	subject	to	rules	of	relevance	and	standards	of	fairness	and	reliability	itself.	The	fairness	and	reliability	of	the	trial	is	not	merely	 a	 function	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 makes	 room	 for	 the	 presentation	 of	evidence,	 but	 of	 the	 institutions	 that	 study	 and	 regulate	 what	 constitutes	admissible	evidence,	how	it	is	collected,	and	so	on.	When	we	complain	of	an	unfair	 trial	 then,	 it	 often	makes	 sense	 to	 in	 fact	 locate	 the	 complaint	 in	 the	broader	 system,	 upon	 which	 the	 fairness	 and	 reliability	 of	 the	 trial	necessarily	 depend.	 The	 unfairness	 of	 the	 lottery	 is	 not	 just	 in	 its	arbitrariness	 but	 in	 its	 place	 in	 an	 overall	 unreliable	 system	 that	 does	 not	prevent	such	an	arbitrary	punitive	practice.		But	there	remains	a	limit	to	what	systemic	procedural	rights	can	do.	I	can	explain	why	Sandra	is	wronged	but	again	I	appealed	to	systemic	features	rather	than	the	particular	fact	that	the	lottery	was	arbitrary.	Even	if	there	is	something	wrong	in	Justland,	I	must	admit	that	no	system	is	perfect,	so	there	is	 always	 the	 possibility	 that	 someone	 could	 be	 subject	 to	 an	 unfair	 trial	
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within	 a	 system	 that	 was	 otherwise	 as	 realistically	 good	 as	 I	 want	 to	stipulate,	 i.e.	within	a	system	that	did	not	violate	 their	 systemic	procedural	rights.	 Call	 such	 a	 case	 Justland+.	 Consider	 Sandra+,	 who	 is	 punished	following	a	trial	where	a	single	rogue	investigator	manufactured	evidence	in	such	a	way	that	is	not	reasonably	discoverable	by	the	system.	The	possibility	of	such	a	case	cannot	be	ruled	out	for	human	institutions	in	all	their	fallibility.	If	 the	wrong	of	an	unfair	 trial	 is	only	systemic,	 then	 it	 looks	 like	Sandra+	 is	not	wronged	since	she,	like	Sandra,	actually	committed	the	crime	that	she	is	framed	for.	The	right	to	a	fair	trial	in	the	traditional	sense	is	precisely	primed	to	 identify	particular	wrongs	 like	 this	but	 the	more	 systemic	 right	 finds	no	fault.		
IV.	THE	ROBUST	GOOD	OF	SECURITY		To	review,	appealing	to	a	pre-institutional	moral	right	against	unreasonable	risk	of	punishment	can	ground	pre-institutional	 rights	 to	 the	establishment	and	 operation	 of	 institutions	 that	 follow	 certain	 procedures.	 Such	 rights	constrain	 choices	 among	 institutional	 alternatives	 and	 so	 fulfill	 the	 role	 of	procedural	 rights	 in	 one	 important	 sense.	 But	 systemic	 procedural	 rights	cannot	ground	a	claim	that	someone	 is	wronged	by	a	particular	 instance	of	punishment	 imposed	 without	 following	 certain	 procedures.	We	 have	 good	reasons	to	want	to	be	able	to	explain	such	wrongs.	In	this	section	I	make	the	case	for	a	more	specific	procedural	right	that	can	play	precisely	this	role.	
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	 A	caveat:	my	argument	in	this	section	is	more	controversial	than	the	argument	for	systemic	rights.	There	I	appealed	to	widely	accepted	premises	like	 a	 right	 against	 unreasonable	 risk.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 employ	 significantly	more	 controversial	 conceptual	 and	 moral	 premises,	 so	 some	 who	 may	 be	convinced	by	my	case	for	systemic	rights	may	remain	unmoved	by	the	case	for	 more	 specific	 procedural	 rights	 in	 this	 section.	 Importantly,	 the	 two	arguments	are	entirely	independent	of	one	another,	although	they	present	a	richer	picture	of	procedural	rights	when	taken	together.	When	Sandra	(or	Sandra+)	 is	punished	by	the	 lottery,	she	 is	harmed	beyond	 simply	 the	 costs	 of	 punishment	 or	 the	 risk	 of	 punishment.	 Sandra	also	suffers	the	denial	of	a	robust	good	to	which	she	has	a	right.	The	idea	of	a	robust	good	comes	from	Philip	Pettit	and	it	rests	on	the	distinctive	notion	of	robustness,	 according	 to	 which	 an	 agent	 controls	 for	 a	 certain	 outcome	across	 relevantly	 close	 possible	 worlds.20	 For	 our	 purposes	 the	 important	
																																																								20.	PETTIT,	supra	note	4.	A	look	at	the	text	reveals	the	range	of	theoretical	commitments	that	Pettit	draws	upon,	including	in	ethics,	action	theory,	and	other	domains.	However,	I	think	that	 the	 idea	 of	 robustness—of	 controlling	 for	 outcomes	 in	 one’s	 deliberations	 through	dispositions	 of	 concern—can	 be	 extracted	 from	 Pettit’s	 broader	 theory,	 including	 his	conclusions	 about	 what	 degree	 of	 robustness	 is	 required	 for	 certain	 goods	 and	 about	political	 philosophy.	 This	 is	 why	 I	 think	 it	 is	 fair	 below	 to	 present	 my	 argument	 as	 a	particular	 way	 of	 explaining	 a	 general	 constraint	 of	 respectful	 treatment	 that	 others	discussing	punishment	have	appealed	to	without	using	Pettit’s	framework.	Teasing	out	the	nuances	of	the	idea	independent	of	all	of	Pettit’s	arguments	is	a	large	task	that	must	be	put	aside	for	our	purposes	here.	
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point	is	this:	Sandra	is	wronged	by	the	lottery	because	she	would	have	been	punished	even	if	she	had	not	committed	the	crime.	This	 is	not	simply	about	an	increased	risk	of	undeserved	harm,	as	Wellman	admits	occurs	in	the	case	where	 the	 punitive	 lottery	 is	 a	 regular	 practice.	 The	 lottery	 is	 not	 like	 an	accident;	 it	 is	 not	 something	 that	 simply	 happened.	 The	 Justlanders	employed	the	lottery	specifically	with	the	intention	to	inflict	hard	treatment	on	 someone	 regardless	 of	 their	 culpability.	 They	 would	 have	 punished	Sandra	 even	 if	 she	 had	 not	 committed	 the	 robbery,	which	 is	 obvious	 since	they	punish	her	even	though	they	do	not	believe	she	committed	the	robbery.	It	 does	 not	 matter	 to	 them	 whether	 she	 deserves	 the	 punishment	 she	receives.	Despite	the	fact	that	she	actually	does	deserve	the	punishment	she	receives,	being	treated	in	this	manner	is	itself	a	harm	that	Sandra	did	not—indeed,	could	not—forfeit	her	right	against.			 The	point	of	 this	 section	 is	 to	make	good	on	 these	claims	by	 further	investigating	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 robust	 good	 and	 to	 show	 that	 we	 have	 a	 pre-institutional	moral	right	that	protects	us	against	the	sort	of	harm	that	Sandra	suffers.	I	take	myself	to	be	explaining	something	that	various	theorists	have	gestured	towards	when	discussing	procedural	rights.	For	example,	Simmons	writes,	 “we	 forfeit	 rights	 by	 our	misconduct	 only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	makes	possible	respectful	punishment.”21	This	notion	of	respect	is	also	connected	to	
																																																								21.	A.	John	Simmons,	Locke	and	the	Right	to	Punish,	20	PHIL.	&	PUB.	AFF.	311	(1991),	at	341.	Original	emphasis.	Simmons	attempts	to	explain	this	idea	of	respect	in	contractarian	terms	
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the	idea	of	individualization:	punishment	must	be	tailored	to	the	individual,	taking	 account	 of	 her	 particular	 circumstances.	 While	 the	 general	 idea	 is	relatively	commonplace,	its	precise	grounds	are	often	less	well	explained	and	grounding	it	in	robust	goods	is,	as	far	as	I	am	aware,	completely	novel.22		A.	Robust	Goods		To	 understand	 how	 I	 employ	 the	 notion	 of	 robust	 goods	 in	 the	 case	 of	procedural	rights,	it	will	help	to	first	step	outside	the	context	of	punishment.	Friendship	 is	 one	 of	 Pettit’s	 paradigmatic	 robust	 goods.	 For	 every	 robust	good,	there	is	an	associated	thin	good,	which	in	the	case	of	friendship	is	care	and	 attention.	 Friends	 treat	 each	 other	with	 care	 and	 attention	 but	 simply	providing	 care	 is	 not	 sufficient	 for	 friendship.	 Someone	who	 provides	 you	care	only	when	it	is	convenient	for	them	and	when	it	advances	their	interests	is	 not	 your	 friend	 because	 they	 give	 the	 thin	 good	 of	 care	 but	 never	 the	robust	 good	 of	 friendship.	 As	 Pettit	 notes,	 “the	 fair-weather	 friend	 is	 no	
																																																																																																																																																							by	appealing	to	what	equal	subjection	to	a	system	of	norms	requires,	as	well	as	in	Kantian	terms	by	appealing	to	not	being	used	as	a	mere	means.		22.	Regarding	precise	grounds,	Duff	is	a	notable	exception,	offering	a	detailed	argument	that	connects	particular	features	of	punitive	systems	to	the	demands	of	respect	for	others	in	a	Kantian	sense,	as	autonomous	moral	agents	whom	the	law	calls	to	account;	see	DUFF,	supra	note	3,	at	6.	 In	distinct	contrast,	my	 focus	 is	on	how	we	must	 treat	others	when	we	risk	harming	them.	
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friend	at	all.”23	They	may	provide	you	with	care	on	particular	occasions	and	you	may	believe	them	to	be	your	friend,	but	they	are	only	your	friend	if	they	not	only	provide	care	but	control	for	providing	care	over	a	suitable	range	of	counterfactuals	or	possible	worlds,	including	some	where	it	is	costly	to	them.	When	they	control	for	giving	you	care	in	this	way,	they	give	you	care	robustly	and	so	also	give	you	friendship.		The	notion	that	friendship	requires	the	provision	of	a	robust	good	is	related	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 true	 friendship	 is	 necessarily	 non-instrumental.24	When	I	provide	the	good	of	 friendship,	Pettit	argues,	 I	do	so	out	of	concern	for	you	in	particular,	not	just	for	the	idea	of	friendship	in	general	or	because	of	the	goods	that	I	might	gain	from	our	friendship.	I	cannot	be	willing	to	swap	friends	in	an	instant	if	I	think	it	would	be	abstractly	optimific	for	me	to	do	so.	Instead	 friendship	 necessarily	 involves	 individualized	 concern	 and	 a	disposition	 to	 provide	 friends	 with	 care	 when	 appropriate.	 When	 friends	control	for	caring	for	one	another	across	a	suitable	range	of	relevant	possible	circumstances,	 they	 express	 the	 value	 that	 they	 place	 in	 their	 relationship	and	the	respect	that	they	reciprocally	have	for	each	other.			 A	notable	advantage	of	the	robustness	schema	is	that	it	steers	us	away	from	conceiving	of	relations	to	others	solely	 in	terms	of	expected	value.25	If	
																																																								23.	PETTIT,	supra	note	4,	at	35.	24.	Dean	Cocking	and	Justin	Oakley,	Indirect	Consequentialism,	Friendship,	and	the	Problem	of	
Alienation,	106	ETHICS	86	(1995).	25.	PETTIT,	supra	note	4,	ch.	5.	
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you	are	my	 friend,	 it	 is	 true	 that	 I	 get	more	 expected	 care	 from	you	 than	 I	would	 otherwise,	 but	 that	 is	 not	 what	 makes	 us	 friends.	 What	 makes	 us	friends	 is	 that	 I	 have	 a	 special,	 protected	 role	 in	 your	 deliberations.	 It	 is	 a	decision	you	make,	and	keep	making	through	the	maintenance	of	a	favorable	disposition,	 to	 treat	me—me	 specifically—as	 a	 friend.	 I	 am	protected	 from	your	 ill-will	 and	 certain	 bad	 outcomes	 because	 of	 my	 place	 in	 your	deliberations,	not	simply	because	you	are	a	mechanistic	source	of	value	 for	me.	To	treat	friendship	as	a	matter	of	expected	value	is	to	take	the	objective	stance	 towards	 friends,	 to	 treat	 friends	 as	mere	 things,	 rather	 than	 to	 take	the	reactive	stance	that	is	appropriate	when	dealing	with	a	person	who	you	recognize	 can	 exercise	 choice	 and	 so	 whom	 you	 must	 trust	 to	 use	 their	discretion	 wisely.	 Evaluating	 situations	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 expected	 value	works	 well	 in	 some	 cases,	 but	 when	 applied	 to	 our	 relations	 with	 other	persons,	 it	 treats	 us	 all	 too	 mechanically.	 (As	 I	 explain	 below,	 for	 our	purposes	this	matters	because	a	risk	of	harm	from	something	impersonal	like	a	 natural	 disaster	 is	 different	 from	 a	 risk	 of	 harm	 from	 another	 person’s	intentional	actions.)		 Pettit	 uses	 the	 same	 basic	 structure—providing	 thin	 goods	 out	 of	 a	disposition	 that	 controls	 for	 the	provision	of	 those	 goods	 across	 a	 relevant	set	 of	 close	 possible	 worlds—to	 analyze	 not	 only	 friendship	 but	 love,	honesty,	respect,	and	many	other	goods,	ultimately	claiming	that	the	general	schema	 is	 widely	 applicable.26	 Following	 this	 lead,	 Seth	 Lazar	 recently																																																									26.	Id.	at	108.	
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applied	 the	 idea	 of	 robust	 goods	 to	 issues	 of	 harm	 and	 risk.27	 Lazar’s	discussion	is	illuminating	given	our	concern	with	these	same	issues,	although	modified	to	fit	our	context	of	punishment.		 Lazar	argues	that,	all	else	equal,	killing	an	innocent	is	worse	when	that	killing	is	riskier	precisely	because	riskier	killings	fail	to	give	others	the	robust	good	of	security	that	they	deserve.	The	good	of	security	is			 robust	 avoidance	 of	 pro	 tanto	 wrongful	 harm.	 To	 enjoy	security,	one	must	not	only	avoid	wrongful	harm	in	the	actual	world,	but	also	do	so	across	relevant	counterfactual	scenarios:	those	 in	which	the	victim	does	not	get	 lucky.	We	are	 insecure	to	the	extent	that	others	make	our	avoidance	of	wrongful	harm	depend	on	luck.28		Just	 like	 friendship,	 security	 as	 a	 robust	 good	 has	 important	 instrumental	benefits,	 such	 as	 peace	 of	 mind,	 but	 is	 also	 non-instrumentally	 valuable.	Security,	 Lazar	 argues,	partly	 constitutes	 autonomy	because	being	 insecure	gives	you	less	control	over	your	life.29	Security	also	partly	constitutes	what	it	means	 to	 be	 a	 member	 in	 good	 standing	 of	 a	 community,	 where	 others	
																																																								27.	 Seth	 Lazar,	Risky	Killing,	 J.	MORAL	 PHIL.	 (forthcoming);	 Seth	 Lazar,	Risky	Killing	 and	 the	
Ethics	of	War,	126	Ethics	91	(2015):	91-117.	Cf.	Pettit,	supra	note	4,	at	175-76.	28.	Lazar,	Risky,	id.	at	8.	29.	Cf.	Oberdiek,	supra	note	10,	at	373ff.	
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express	 their	 concern	 for	 you	 through	 a	 disposition	 to	 protect	 you	 against	wrongful	harms.30			 A	 modified	 version	 of	 one	 of	 Lazar’s	 examples	 can	 help	 us	 better	understand	 the	 robust	 good	 of	 security.	 Consider	 Allie,	 a	 worker	 who	 is	tasked	 with	 demolishing	 a	 building.	 Unbeknownst	 to	 Allie,	 Bruce	 is	 in	 the	building.	 Allie	 knows	 that	 there	 could	 be	 people	 in	 the	 building—such	 a	possibility	is	intrinsic	to	the	task	of	demolishing	large	structures.	In	the	first	case,	 she	 thoroughly	 checks	 the	 building	 because	 she	 is	 concerned	 with	people’s	 lives:	 she	does	not	want	 to	kill	 anyone	and	 it	 is	 relatively	easy	 for	her	to	take	the	time	and	effort	to	go	through	the	building	before	she	destroys	it.	She	finds	Bruce	and	removes	him.	In	this	case	she	gives	Bruce	the	robust	good	 of	 security	 and	 expresses	 her	 concern	 for	 others	 in	 her	 community,	including	 Bruce.31	 In	 the	 second	 case,	 she	 decides	 not	 to	 check	 and	demolishes	 the	building,	killing	Bruce.	 In	 this	 case,	not	only	did	 she	violate	his	right	to	life,	she	failed	to	give	him	security:	she	was	indifferent	to	the	very	live	 possibility	 that	 someone	 might	 be	 in	 the	 building	 she	 was	 going	 to	demolish.	Finally,	in	the	third	case,	she	decides	not	to	check	but	Bruce	is	able																																																									30.	Lazar,	Risky,	supra	note	24,	at	8-9.	31.	Note	that	the	only	role	of	this	case	is	to	illustrate	robust	goods	and	how	to	consider	them.	Their	 particular	 role	 in	 justifying	 procedural	 rights	 is	 articulated	 below	 and	 the	 contrast	with	other	ways	of	accounting	 for	similar	concerns,	 like	 focusing	solely	on	 levels	of	risk,	 is	emphasized	at	that	point.	These	other	methodologies	may	well	account	for	the	Allie	case	just	as	 well	 as	 robust	 goods	 do;	 the	 point	 is	 the	 distinct	 roles	 they	 play	 with	 respect	 to	punishment.	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pushing	me	to	clarify	this	point.	
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to	escape	with	his	life.	In	this	case	she	did	not	violate	his	right	to	life	but	she	did	 fail	 to	 give	 him	 security	 precisely	 because	 she	 still	 acted	 on	 her	indifference	to	the	possibility	that	he	was	 in	the	building	and	that	he	might	be	wrongfully	killed.32	Bruce	is	alive	but	insecure:	the	fact	that	he	lived	was	a	result	of	luck,	not	of	Allie	controlling	for	avoiding	wrongfully	harming	him.		 The	proposed	 robust	 good	of	 security	 is	 intuitively	 plausible.	 Critics	may	want	to	account	for	security—or	even	robust	goods	in	general—strictly	in	terms	of	expected	value,	or	blameworthiness	rather	than	permissibility,	or	
																																																								32.	There	is	a	fourth	possibility:	Allie	checks	thoroughly	but	Bruce	is	undiscoverable	and	he	dies	when	she	demolishes	the	building.	My	inclination	is	to	say	of	this	case	that	Allie	gave	Bruce	 the	 good	 of	 security—she	 surely	 did	 not	 violate	 any	 right	 he	 has	 to	 security—because	she	did	her	due	diligence	but	that	she	still	violates	his	right	to	 life	(since	he	had	done	 nothing	 to	 forfeit	 or	 waive	 it).	 Bruce	 was	 as	 secure	 as	 Allie	 could	 make	 him	 but	security	 is	 not	 everything.	 The	 way	 Pettit	 defines	 robust	 goods	 seems	 to	 make	 this	impossible,	though,	because	one	can	only	give	someone	a	robust	good	when	one	also	gives	the	thin	good	and	Allie	did	not	secure	the	thin	good	of	avoiding	wrongfully	harming	Bruce.	This	 is	one	place	where	our	theory	of	robust	goods	can	come	apart	from	Pettit’s	but	 it	 is	also	 tangential	 to	our	discussion	of	procedural	 rights.	One	 thing	we	can	agree	on	 is	 that	Allie	expressed	the	concern	that	security	requires	and	that	she	treated	him	as	person	with	equal	 status	 in	her	 community,	 as	 far	as	 she	was	able.	 (Analogously,	 there	may	be	cases	where	someone	acts	as	a	friend	should,	and	so	remains	your	friend,	even	when	she	cannot	give	 you	 the	 thin	 good	 of	 care	 for	 reasons	 outsider	 her	 control,	 like	 if	 she	 suffers	 a	debilitating	accident.)	
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with	a	variety	of	other	strategies.33	I	will	not	pretend	to	have	given	the	robust	good	of	security	a	full	defense.	As	I	noted	above,	my	argument	here	depends	on	considerably	more	controversial	premises,	in	particular	the	existence	of	a	robust	good	of	security.	From	here	forward	I	will	take	such	a	good	to	exist	in	order	 to	 explore	 the	 possibility	 that	 it	 can	 ground	 pre-institutional	 moral	procedural	rights.			B.	To	Procedural	Rights		Even	if	there	is	a	robust	good	of	security,	I	still	need	to	show	three	things	for	the	 purposes	 of	 grounding	 procedural	 rights.	 First,	 that	we	 all	 have	 a	 pre-institutional	moral	right	 to	 the	provision	of	security	 from	other	 individuals.	Second,	 that	such	a	right	requires	that	we	follow	specific	procedures	 in	our	treatment	of	others,	especially	 in	the	case	of	meting	out	punishment.	Third,	that	such	a	right	is	not	forfeit	by	culpable	offenses.		If	I	can	show	all	three	elements,	then	we	can	say	that	everyone	has	a	right	not	to	be	punished	by	other	individuals	absent	fair	procedures,	even	in	the	state	of	nature	and	even	against	the	background	of	a	sufficiently	reliable	punitive	system,	because	doing	so	would	fail	to	provide	them	with	the	robust	
																																																								33.	 Lazar	 addresses	 some	 of	 these	 concerns	 in	 the	 case	 of	 security	 and,	 of	 course,	 Pettit	considers	 many	 in	 the	 general	 case	 of	 robust	 goods.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 Wellman	pursues	 similar	 sorts	 of	 debunking	 strategies	 against	 other	 proposed	 grounds	 for	procedural	rights,	so	he	may	well	be	amenable	to	pressing	them	here	as	well.	
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good	 of	 security	 (or:	 doing	 so	 would	 make	 them	 wrongfully	 insecure.)	Punishing	Sandra	using	a	punitive	lottery	thus	wrongs	her	because	it	violates	her	procedural	 rights	 that	 are	derived	 from	her	 right	 to	 security.	 Similarly,	punishing	someone	in	the	state	of	nature	without	first	going	through	a	trial	and	 other	 sufficiently	 fair	 and	 reliable	 procedures	 wrongs	 them.	 If	 this	 is	true,	then	we	will	have	found	a	ground	for	pre-institutional	moral	procedural	rights	of	the	sort	that	can	play	the	role	of	identifying	the	particular	wrong	of	punishing	 absent	 appropriate	 procedures	 in	 particular	 cases,	 across	 the	variety	of	contexts	in	which	those	judgments	seem	apt.	The	remainder	of	the	article	takes	up	these	three	tasks.	First,	even	if	security	is	a	robust	good,	and	even	if	we	all	have	interests	in	such	a	good,	why	think	that	this	amounts	to	a	right	to	security?34	 	We	do	not	have	a	right	to	all	good	things	or	to	all	good	sorts	of	treatment;	romantic	love	 is	 a	 robust	 good	 on	 Pettit’s	 account	 but	 nobody	 has	 a	 right	 to	 be	romantically	 loved	 that	 correlates	 to	 another	 person’s	 duty	 to	 love	 them.35	Further,	as	Alexander	notes,	 it	 is	not	plausible	that	there	is	a	duty	to	follow	strict	 procedures	 whenever	 we	 risk	 setting	 the	 interests	 of	 others	 back	
																																																								34.	Lazar	mostly	refrains	from	discussing	a	right	to	security	because	his	concern	is	with	its	exacerbating	or	aggravating	role	but	he	says	that	a	right	to	security	is	plausible.	See	Lazar,	
Risky,	supra	note	24,	at	7,	note	20,	and	16.	35.	Wellman,	supra	note	1,	at	298	raises	a	similar	complaint	against	a	publicity	constraint:	it	may	be	good	for	justice	to	be	done	publicly	but	that	is	distinct	from	having	a	right	to	public	justice.	
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because	anything	we	do	entails	such	a	risk.36	It	would	unreasonably	explode	our	duties.	To	 me,	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 while	 we	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 security	broadly	speaking,	we	only	have	a	right	 to	security	when	our	most	essential	interests	 are	 at	 stake.37	 If	 I	 demonstrate	 a	 lack	 of	 concern	 such	 that	 I	 risk	lightly	scratching	your	forearm,	I	may	have	made	you	less	secure	and	I	may	have	acted	blameworthily	but	I	do	not	seem	to	have	not	violated	any	of	your	rights.38	But	it	is	harder	to	deny	a	right	to	security	when	we	are	considering	avoiding	violations	of	essential	interests,	like	simply	remaining	alive.	This	is	
																																																								36.	Alexander,	supra	note	3,	at	33.	37.	 This	 distinction	 could	 collapse	 if	 pro	 tanto	wrongs	 of	 the	 sort	 referred	 to	 in	 Lazar’s	definition	of	security	are	restricted	to	violations	of	essential	interests.	But	this	seems	too	strong:	because	of	my	property	 rights	 it	 is	pro	 tanto	wrongful	 to	harm	my	property,	 for	example	by	scratching	my	car,	but	having	an	unscratched	car	seems	in	no	way	essential	to	my	well-being.	Some	wrongs	are	minor.	38.	Restricting	the	right	to	security	to	cases	of	essential	interests	answers	an	argument	from	Wellman,	supra	note	1,	at	296-97.	He	gives	the	example	of	Elizabeth	and	Philippa:	Philippa	takes	 twenty	dollars	 from	Elizabeth	but	 later	Elizabeth,	not	 knowing	Philippa	had	 taken	her	money	and	fully	 intending	to	steal	 from	Philippa,	 takes	her	own	twenty	dollars	right	back.	 Wellman	 contends	 that	 Elizabeth	 has	 done	 nothing	 wrong	 (although	 she	 is	blameworthy).	If	a	right	to	security	covered	wrongful	harms	of	any	kind,	it	might	run	afoul	of	 this	case	(assuming	you	agree	with	Wellman’s	assessment).	But	while	Elizabeth	might	be	 undermining	 Philippa’s	 interest	 in	 security,	 since	 it	 only	 involves	 a	 small	 amount	 of	money	 Philippa’s	 right	 to	 security	 does	 not	 cover	 such	 a	 case	 and	 so	 Elizabeth	 has	 not	violated	Philippa’s	rights	in	this	case.	
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why	 the	Allie	 case	 is	 compelling.	 If	 you	 are	undertaking	 a	 task	 that	 is	 very	destructive	 and	 you	 know	 that	 someone	 could	 easily	 be	 killed	 by	 your	actions,	 to	 proceed	 without	 taking	 precautions	 demonstrates	 a	 critical,	wrongful	lack	of	concern	for	the	lives	of	others.		When	Bruce	barely	escapes	with	his	 life,	he	has	a	complaint	not	 just	because	there	was	some	chance	that	he	would	die	but	because	Allie	did	not	even	 do	 the	 bare	 minimum	 to	 ensure	 that	 her	 risky	 action	 would	 not	 kill	anyone.	As	Lazar	emphasizes,	it	is	not	just	that	there	was	some	objective	risk	of	 Bruce	 dying	 but	 that	 Allie	 acts	 without	 knowing	whether	 she	 is	 risking	killing	 anyone	 and	without	 even	 attempting	 the	 clear	 steps	 that	 she	 could	take	to	find	out.	Another	way	of	framing	this	is	that	the	good	of	demolishing	the	building	without	securing	the	site	is	very	much	outweighed	by	the	bad	of	a	 wrongful	 and	 unnecessary	 death,	 so	 when	 proceeding	 to	 demolish	 the	building	without	due	diligence,	the	reckless	version	of	Allie	is	expressing	how	little	she	actually	values	the	 lives	of	others	and	how	much	she	undercounts	their	worth	when	she	acts.	She	does	not	give	others’	lives	the	protected	place	in	 her	 practical	 deliberations	 that	 she	 should	 by	 controlling	 for	 avoiding	wrongfully	 killing	 or	 injuring	 them.	 This	 is	 also	why	 such	 a	 right	 is	 clearly	held	against	individuals:	it	is	about	how	we	are	each	obligated	to	treat	others	when	 we	 undertake	 actions	 that	 we	 know	 risk	 harming	 others’	 essential	interests.	Such	 a	 right	 to	 security	 also	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 pre-institutional	 moral	right,	 so	 obligates	 us	 to	 act	 in	 certain	 ways	 even	 absent	 relevant	
35		
institutions.39	 If	 I	 am	 going	 to	 undertake	 a	 risky	 task,	 like	 burning	 down	 a	field	 that	 separates	 my	 house	 from	my	 neighbors’	 house,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 I	wrong	my	neighbors	 if	 I	do	not	take	sufficient	care	 for	their	 lives.	 I	need	to	warn	them;	I	need	to	set	up	firebreaks;	 in	general	 I	need	to	make	sure	that	my	act	does	not	threaten	to	burn	down	their	house	and	kill	them.	Otherwise	they	clearly	can	complain	 that	 I	did	not	express	adequate	concern	even	 if	 I	get	 lucky	 and	 they	 are	 not	 harmed.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 ultimately	 the	 details	 of	such	 concern	 need	 to	 be	 specified	 by	 institutions,	 so	 out	 of	 the	 state	 of	nature,	but	disagreement	over	borderline	cases	should	not	prevent	us	 from	
																																																								39.	Note	also	that	the	duty	correlated	to	this	right	holds	even	when	someone	in	the	state	of	nature	 has	 done	 their	 fair	 share	 to	 establish	 institutions	 that	 would	 better	 protect	 and	respect	this	right.	Consider	an	analogy	to	emergency	aid	services,	an	issue	of	 importance	for	Wellman’s	Samaritan	justification	for	the	state.	One	implication	of	the	pre-institutional	rights	that	people	have	is	that	they	be	aided	when	they	are	in	danger	and	aid	is	of	little	cost	to	 bystanders.	 The	 only	 way	 to	 secure	 these	 rights	 generally	 in	 our	 actual	 conditions,	where	natural	disasters	and	accidents	and	so	forth	are	a	regular,	if	unpredictable,	feature	of	the	world,	is	to	set	up	institutions	like	police	and	firefighters	and	paramedics.	Imagine	someone	who	has	done	 their	 fair	 share	 in	 the	 state	of	nature	 to	 set	up	 such	 institutions	but,	because	other	people	are	not	contributing,	such	institutions	do	not	exist.	This	does	not	mean	that	if	this	person	comes	across	a	situation	of	easy	rescue	that	she	does	not	have	a	duty	to	aid	the	person	in	harm’s	way.	The	institutional	duty	and	the	individual	duty	may	rest	 in	 the	 same	 concern	 for	 the	 person	 as	 an	 individual	who	matters,	 but	 fulfilling	 one	does	not	entail	fulfilling	the	other.	Similarly,	then,	even	the	person	who	has	done	her	fair	share	to	set	up	fair	punitive	institutions	but	remains	in	a	state	of	nature	still	has	the	duty	not	to	make	others	insecure	in	their	essential	interests.	
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saying	that	taking	risks	with	others’	lives	without	sufficient	precautions	can	sometimes	 clearly	 wrong	 them	 by	 denying	 them	 the	 security	 that	 they	deserve.	A	 complete	 defense	 of	 the	 right	 to	 security	would	 need	 to	 go	more	deeply	into	rights	theory;	an	important	interest	in	security	plausibly	grounds	the	 right	 to	 security	 on	 an	 interest	 theory	 of	 rights	 but	 it	 is	 a	 more	 open	question	 whether	 a	 will	 theory	 of	 rights	 would	 also	 endorse	 the	 right	 to	security	 (although	 the	 non-instrumental	 value	 of	 security	 in	 partially	constituting	 autonomy	 suggests	 that	 it	 could).	 I	 cannot	 undertake	 such	 a	project	 here	 but	 it	 is	 plausible	 that	 we	 have	 such	 a	 right.	 If	 we	 are	 owed	concern	from	others,	it	makes	sense	to	say	we	have	a	right	that	they	control	for	 avoiding	 wrongful	 harms	 when	 they	 risk	 setting	 back	 our	 essential	interests.	Thus	it	is	plausible	that	we	all	have	a	pre-institutional	moral	right	to	the	provision	of	the	robust	good	of	security	held	against	other	individuals,	which	correlates	to	a	duty	to	provide	security	on	their	part—in	short,	a	right	to	security.			 Turning	to	our	second	main	task:	even	if	we	have	a	right	to	security,	why	 think	 that	 this	 right	 requires	 certain	 procedures	 to	 be	 followed,	 such	that	 procedural	 rights	 can	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 right	 to	 security?	 The	 Allie	example	is	helpful	here	as	well.	Given	that	demolishing	the	building	involves	a	 lot	 of	 destruction	 and	would	 almost	 surely	 kill	 anyone	 inside,	 Allie	 has	 a	duty	 to	 check	 the	 building	 for	 occupants	 before	 demolishing	 it	 based	 in	people’s	 right	 to	 security.	 Surely	not	 any	procedure	will	 suffice	 in	 order	 to	
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fulfill	 her	 duty	 to	 provide	 security:	 simply	 calling	 a	 quiet	 warning	 from	outside	 is	 not	 sufficient.	 She	must	 check	 the	whole	 building.	 If	 she	 did	 not	follow	 the	 procedure	 of	 inspecting	 every	 room	 in	 the	 building	 before	destroying	 it,	 she	 wrongs	 anyone	 in	 the	 building	 in	 virtue	 of	 her	 lack	 of	concern	 for	 their	 well-being.	 Given	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 task	 that	 she	 is	undertaking	and	the	risk	that	she	poses	to	others’	lives,	particular	sufficiently	reliable	 procedures	 are	 required	 and	 others	 have	 a	 right	 against	 her	 using	insufficiently	 reliable	 procedures	 like	 only	 calling	 from	 outside	 or	 only	checking	 the	 entrance.	 Like	 rights	 against	 double	 jeopardy	 or	 the	 use	 of	punitive	lotteries,	this	is	a	negative	procedural	right	that	protects	us	against	procedures	of	certain	sorts.			 To	my	mind	this	example	suffices	to	show	that	in	cases	where	people’s	sufficiently	 important	 interests	 are	 at	 stake	 such	 that	 they	 have	 a	 right	 to	security,	that	right	can	only	be	respected	by	following	certain	procedures.	In	other	cases	where	security	matters	 less,	so	 there	 is	only	an	 interest	and	no	right	 as	 in	 cases	where	 severe	physical	harm	 is	not	 realistically	possible,	 it	may	 be	 the	 case	 that	 you	 can	 provide	 someone	 with	 the	 robust	 good	 of	security	 absent	 following	 procedures.	 But	 when	 the	 interest	 is	 important	enough	to	ground	a	right,	procedures	are	necessary.			 That	 said,	 the	 case	 for	 procedural	 rights	 derived	 from	 the	 right	 to	security	is	even	clearer	in	the	case	of	punishment.	In	Allie’s	case,	she	does	not	know	whether	anyone	is	 in	the	building;	 it	might	be	that	nobody	is	harmed	by	her	act.	But	punishment	necessarily	 involves	 the	 intentional	 infliction	of	
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harm.	There	is	no	chance	that	nobody	will	be	harmed	by	punishment	because	harm	is	intrinsic	to	punishment.	When	intentionally	inflicting	harm,	the	only	way	to	also	provide	security	is	to	follow	rigorous	procedures.		 Providing	 security	while	 harming	may	 seem	paradoxical	 on	 its	 face.	The	 first	 thing	to	note	 is	 that	we	defined	security	as	avoidance	of	pro	tanto	
wrongful	harm,	not	just	harm	per	se.	Consider	the	sort	of	harm	involved	in	a	martial	arts	bout.	The	harm	here	is	not	wrongful	because	it	is	consensual.	But	participants	 can	 still	 undermine	 the	 other’s	 security	 if	 they	 go	 beyond	 the	regulations	 that	 restrain	 the	 harm,	 for	 example	 if	 they	 modify	 their	equipment	or	use	banned	techniques.	The	harm	participants	 inflict	on	each	other	 can	 remain	within	 the	bounds	of	 concern	 and	 security;	 indeed,	 to	be	indifferent	 to	 the	 regulations	 of	 the	 sport	 or	 to	 purposefully	 flout	 them	precisely	expresses	a	wrongful	lack	of	care	given	the	gravity	of	the	practice.		 Notice	that	intentionally	inflicting	harm	is	prima	facie	wrongful.	When	we	undertake	to	intentionally	inflict	harm,	then,	to	avoid	pro	tanto	wrongful	harm	 we	 have	 to	 confirm	 that	 the	 harm	 is	 not	 wrongful,	 for	 example	 by	confirming	 waiver,	 necessity,	 or	 forfeiture.40	 The	 only	 way	 to	 sufficiently																																																									40.	The	distinction	between	pro	 tanto	and	prima	 facie	wrongs	matters	a	great	deal	 for	our	purposes	 here.	 A	 pro	 tanto	wrong	 is	 genuinely	 wrongful	 but	 it	 may	 be	 outweighed	 all	things	considered,	so	 it	may	be	 justified	to	 inflict	 the	wrong.	A	prima	facie	wrong	 is	only	wrong	in	usual	circumstances;	in	some	circumstances	it	may	not	be	wrong	at	all.	A	prima	
facie	wrong	can	become	pro	tanto	wrong	when	we	consider	it	in	particular	circumstances.	The	 point,	 then,	 is	 that	 since	 intentionally	 harming	 is	 usually	 wrong,	 absent	 special	circumstances,	 to	 show	 appropriate	 concern	 for	 avoiding	 actually	 wronging	 someone	
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reliably	confirm	the	permissibility	of	 intentionally	 inflicting	harm	and	so	 to	sufficiently	reliably	control	for	avoiding	pro	tanto	wrongful	harm	is	to	follow	procedures—probably	redundant	procedures—before	inflicting	the	harm.41		Since	punishment	necessarily	involves	intentionally	harming	others,	it	must	follow	procedures	in	order	to	control	for	avoiding	wrongful	harms.	The	particular	 procedures	 required	 depend	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 practice.	 The	intentional	 harm	 of	 punishment	 is	 not	wrongful	 only	 when	 a	 person	 has	forfeited	her	 rights	 against	 punishment	 by	 culpably	 committing	 an	offense.	The	procedures	that	must	be	followed	to	protect	against	pro	tanto	wrongful	harm	 in	 the	 case	 of	 punishment,	 then,	 must	 be	 the	 procedures	 that	sufficiently	 test	 that	 punishment	 is	 deserved	 because	 the	 offender	 has	forfeited	her	 rights	against	punishment	by	committing	 the	 relevant	act	and	because	she	was	culpable	 for	doing	so.	Such	procedures	thus	must	take	the																																																																																																																																																								when	we	intentionally	harm	them,	we	have	to	be	very	sure	that	the	special	circumstances	are	met.	41.	This	 is	perhaps	more	complicated	 in	 the	case	of	defensive	harm,	where	 time	 is	often	a	factor	 and	 so	 following	 procedures	 may	 be	 self-defeating.	 That	 is	 not	 a	 concern	 in	 our	context	 of	 punishment.	 But	 notice	 that	 even	 in	 the	 context	 of	 defensive	 harm,	 the	 time	crunch	 is	why	we	want	 the	 people	who	 are	most	 likely	 to	 have	 to	 deal	 defensive	 harm	follow	strict	procedures	in	their	training.	We	try	to	inculcate	the	appropriate	procedures	into	the	level	of	reflex	precisely	so	the	procedures	can	control	the	imposition	of	harm	even	under	 severe	 time	constraints.	This	 is	why	police	practice	 shooting	courses	where	 some	targets	 are	 innocents:	 it	 builds	 the	 procedure	 of	 checking	 for	 innocence	 (if	 at	 a	 shallow	level	 of	 appearance)	 into	 the	 moment	 where	 wrongful	 harm	 is	 most	 likely	 and	 most	devastating.	
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form	 of	 judicial	 procedures	 we	 are	 familiar	 with:	 the	 presentation	 of	evidence	on	both	sides	 to	disinterested	third	parties,	standards	of	evidence	to	 be	 met,	 the	 possibility	 of	 appeal,	 and	 so	 on.	 Because	 the	 intentional	infliction	 of	 harm	 is	 such	 a	 grave	 matter	 and	 because	 we	 have	 a	 duty	 to	provide	 security	 for	 others,	 when	 we	 punish	 we	 have	 to	 follow	 especially	rigorous	and	redundant	procedures	to	ensure	that	we	are	avoiding	pro	tanto	wrongful	 harm.	 Otherwise	 we	 fail	 to	 do	 our	 duty	 of	 providing	 security	 to	others	and	thereby	wrong	them.	In	 the	 context	 of	Wellman’s	 skeptical	 challenge,	 it	 is	 also	 especially	important	to	note	the	modal	character	of	the	right	to	security:	robust	goods	have	to	control	for	outcomes	across	a	relevant	range	of	close	possible	worlds.	In	Lazar’s	 terms,	we	have	 to	make	sure	not	only	 that	we	do	not	wrongfully	harm	 but	 that	 others	 do	 not	 depend	 on	 luck	 or	 chance	 to	 avoid	 wrongful	harms.	 (Note	 that	 the	 Justlanders	 get	 exceedingly	 lucky	 that	 they	 do	 not	wrongfully	 harm	 Sandra.	 It	 was	 a	 one	 in	 ten	 million—the	 population	 of	Justland—chance	 that	 the	 lottery	 picked	 the	 actual	 robber	 and	 when	 you	take	into	account	the	possibility	that	Sandra	committed	the	robbery	but	was	not	culpable,	the	odds	of	having	not	wrongfully	harmed	her	are	even	lower.)	To	provide	the	robust	good	of	security	to	others,	it	is	not	sufficient	that	we	do	not	wrongfully	harm	them.	We	have	to	control	for	not	wrongfully	harm	them	by	giving	them	appropriate	concern	 in	our	deliberations	about	how	we	act.	We	 owe	 them	 this	 concern	 out	 of	 the	 basic	 respect	 that	 follows	 from	recognizing	 that	 they	 matter,	 that	 intentionally	 inflicting	 harm	 is	 usually	
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wrong,	that	we	are	fallible,	and	further	that	punishment	is	a	practice	that	is	historically	rife	with	abuse.	Punishing	without	following	rigorous	procedures	wrongs	others	because	it	does	not	give	them	the	security	they	deserve.	So	 we	 have	 a	 pre-institutional	 moral	 right	 to	 security	 that	 requires	that	 we	 follow	 certain	 procedures,	 especially	 when	we	 intentionally	 inflict	harm	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 punishment.	 But	 all	 this	 would	 be	 irrelevant	 to	Wellman’s	skepticism	if	we	forfeit	our	right	to	security	when	we	forfeit	our	right	against	punishment.	For	example,	it	is	clear	that	if	rights	forfeiture	were	absolute,	 i.e.	culpably	committing	an	offense	forfeits	all	of	one’s	rights,	 then	Sandra	is	not	wronged	regardless	of	any	consideration	of	security.	But	such	an	absolutist	view	of	rights	forfeiture	is	implausible;	one	of	the	main	tasks	of	a	 rights	 forfeiture	 theorist	 is	 to	make	 clear	which	 rights	 are	 forfeit	 and	 to	what	extent,	thereby	giving	forfeiture	plausible	limits.	Just	because	someone	committed	 a	 robbery	 does	 not	 we	 can	 punish	 them	 by	 killing	 them	 or	torturing	 them.	 Such	 is	 a	 standard	 liberal	 commitment	 to	 the	 existence	 of	limits	on	 treatment	demanded	by	 the	 inherent	 respect	due	each	person.	So	the	 question	 is:	 even	 if	 a	 culpable	 offender	 forfeits	 her	 rights	 against	 an	appropriate	punishment,	and	even	if	she	forfeits	her	rights	against	the	risk	of	that	 punishment,	 does	 she	 forfeit	 her	 right	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 the	 robust	good	of	security?	I	claim	that	she	does	not.	The	 important	 point	 is	 that	 security	 is	 not	 reducible	 to	 minimizing	risks	or	maximizing	expected	value.	If	it	were	then	Sandra	would	forfeit	her	right	to	security,	just	as	she	forfeits	her	right	to	a	risk	of	punishment	that	she	
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deserves.	 But	 security	 is	 more	 than	 risks;	 again,	 it	 has	 non-instrumental	value	 and	 is	 instantiated	 by	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 treatment,	 not	 simply	 an	impersonal	estimation	of	the	likelihood	of	harm.	It	is	a	demand	made	by	the	status	of	others	as	persons	who	matter	and	whose	lives	we	have	to	express	concern	 for	 by	 giving	 them	 a	 protected	 place	 in	 our	 deliberations	 when	considering	how	to	treat	them.		Its	foundation	is	the	same	as	the	right	against	torture	or	cruelty.	The	right	to	security	is	an	ineliminable	part,	I	think,	of	a	broadly	liberal	approach	to	punishment.	We	do	not	condemn	persons	in	their	entirety	or	in	perpetuity	for	 committing	 crimes.	 We	 think	 that	 even	 the	 guilty	 who	 deserve	punishment	have	moral	rights	and	can	appropriately	make	certain	demands	of	 us.	 Chief	 among	 these	 is	 the	 concern	 to	 avoid	wrongfully	 harming	 them	when	we	inflict	punishment,	not	simply	to	avoid	punishing	them	when	they	are	innocent	but	also	to	avoid	over-punishing	them.			 If	 this	 is	 right,	 then	 Sandra	 is	wronged	 by	 the	 punitive	 lottery	 even	though	 she	 forfeited	 her	 right	 against	 punishment	 because	 the	 Justlanders’	violate	 her	 right	 to	 the	 robust	 good	 of	 security	 when	 they	 do	 not	 follow	procedures	that	control	for	avoiding	inflicting	pro	tanto	wrongful	harms.	As	I	wrote	above,	Sandra	is	wronged	by	the	lottery	because	she	would	have	been	punished	 even	 if	 she	 had	 not	 committed	 the	 crime.	 The	 Justlanders	 do	 not	show	her	sufficient	concern.			 The	 idea	 that	 punishment	 has	 to	 follow	 certain	 procedures	 in	 order	for	people	 to	be	secure	 is	 intuitively	very	plausible.	Recall	Lazar’s	 idea	 that	
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security	 is	 non-instrumentally	 valuable	 because	 of	 the	 role	 it	 plays	 in	autonomy	 and	 in	 our	 standing	 in	 community.	 Being	 punished	 without	concern	 for	 avoiding	wrongful	 harms	undermines	 our	 ability	 to	 choose	 for	ourselves	and	indicates	a	lesser	status	than	we	deserve.	The	wrongs	are	even	clearer	 in	 aggregate:	 in	 societies	 where	 punishment	 is	 not	 constrained	 by	extremely	 demanding	 procedures,	 the	 possibility	 of	 arbitrary	 and	undeserved	 punishment	 undermines	 people’s	 security	 in	 precisely	 these	ways.	They	become	less	able	to	control	their	lives,	which	is	bad	in	itself	and	also	has	extremely	detrimental	consequences,	and	they	are	less	able	to	assert	standing	 in	 the	 community,	 becoming	 obsequious	 or	 reserved.	 In	 such	societies	whether	your	life	will	continue	to	be	decent	depends	largely	on	luck	and	also	creates	many	more	opportunities	 for	abuse	and	oppression	on	the	part	of	authorities	by	granting	 them	wider	discretion	because	 they	are	 less	constrained	by	formal	procedures.				 In	 sum,	 the	 right	 to	 security	 grounds	 procedural	 rights	 that	 explain	the	wrong	done	to	a	person	by	being	punished	without	the	punishing	agent	having	 controlled	 for	 avoiding	 wronging	 her,	 the	 second	 major	 role	 we	identified	for	procedural	rights	in	section	one.	In	combination	with	systemic	procedural	rights,	then,	we	have	different	sorts	of	procedural	rights	that	play	both	 important	 roles	 that	 we	 identified.	 But	 it	 may	 be	 the	 case	 that	procedural	rights	grounded	in	security	can	also	play	the	role	of	constraining	choices	 between	 institutional	 alternatives.	 For	 example,	 if	 what	 counts	 as	sufficient	 control	 for	 avoiding	 harming	 requires	 not	 just	 following	 certain	
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procedures	 but	 following	 procedures	 that	 are	 embedded	 within,	 and	 gain	reliability	 from,	a	sufficiently	reliable	system,	 then	the	right	 to	security	will	ground	 systemic	 procedural	 rights	 as	 well.	 In	 that	 case	 we	 could	 have	 a	complete	theory	of	procedural	rights	grounded	only	in	the	right	to	security.	That	 said,	 my	 purpose	 here	 is	 to	 address	 the	 skeptical	 challenge	 to	procedural	 rights	 in	 general,	 so	 I	will	 not	 pursue	 the	 idea	 of	 extending	 the	(admittedly	controversial)	right	to	security.		 To	 briefly	 conclude,	 Wellman’s	 arguments	 against	 some	 procedural	rights	are	important	and	should	affect	how	we	think	of	the	justification	of	our	judicial	 institutions.	However,	his	very	general	conclusion	that	 there	are	no	general,	 moral,	 judicial,	 procedural	 rights	 is	 false.	 First,	 our	 general	 right	against	 unreasonable	 risk,	 including	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 punishment,	grounds	 systemic	 procedural	 rights	 that	 demand	 our	 practices	 of	punishment	be	institutionalized	and	that	those	institutions	follow	sufficiently	reliable	 procedures.	 Some	 procedures	 will	 be	 ineliminable	 from	 such	 a	system,	including	the	general	procedure	of	a	trial,	but	other	procedures	that	we	have	sometimes	taken	to	be	important	elements	of	rule	of	law,	like	a	right	against	double	jeopardy,	may	not	be.	Second,	our	right	to	the	provision	of	the	robust	good	of	security	grounds	procedural	rights	because	we	have	the	right	that	 others	 take	 care	 to	 avoid	 inflicting	 pro	 tanto	wrongful	 harms	 on	 us.	Punishment	 is	 prima	 facie	wrongful	 since	 it	 is	 the	 intentional	 infliction	 of	grave	harm,	so	the	only	way	to	punish	people	without	making	them	insecure	is	to	use	exceptionally	reliable	procedures	to	test	the	claim	that	punishment	
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is	permissible	in	a	particular	case,	taking	account	of	the	victim	of	harm	in	all	their	 individuality	 and	 demonstrating	 appropriate	 concern	 for	 them	 as	 a	person	even	if	they	are	a	culpable	offender.42	
																																																								42.	Compare	RONALD	DWORKIN,	TAKING	RIGHTS	SERIOUSLY	13	(1978).		
